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Abstract: A country’s financial system is internationally illiquid if its potential short-term obligations in foreign
currency exceed the amount of foreign currency it can have access to in short notice. This condition may be
necessary and sufficient for financial crises and/or exchange rate collapses (Chang and Velasco 1998a, b). In this
paper we argue that the 1997–98 crises in Asia were in fact a consequence of international illiquidity. This
follows from an analysis of empirical indicators of illiquidity as well as other macroeconomic statistics. We trace
the emergence of illiquidity to financial liberalization, the shortening of the foreign debt structure, and the
currency denomination of assets versus liabilities. We explain how financial crises became exchange rate
collapses due to a government policy of both fixing exchange rates and acting as lender of last resort. Finally, we
outline the policy implications of our view for preventing crises and for dealing with them.
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The Asian Liquidity Crisis
I. An Old Type of Crisis
Whenever another crisis erupts in the world, it is tempting to identify it as an
unprecedented syndrome and develop a new theory to go with it. This has happened in the
aftermath of the Asian crash. Some analysts have claimed that it is a new type of crisis in that it
was not caused by an irresponsible government running large deficits and printing money to
finance them. Others have claimed that it is also a new type of crisis, but for the opposite reason:
an irresponsible government provided guarantees to banks, causing moral hazard,
overinvestment, and inflated asset prices that finally had to come tumbling down. In both cases,
novelty is the operative concept.
These claims miss a central lesson from the Asian crisis. This crash is not a new and
frightening creature just emerging from the depths of the South China Sea, but a classic financial
crisis made possible by the illiquidity of the financial sector, the likes of which we have seen
before in so-called emerging markets. Chile in 1982 and Mexico in 1994 provide the clearest, but
by no means the only, precedents. These classic crises have five distinguishing elements:
1. International illiquidity, which sometimes results in outright collapse of the financial
system (often but not always the commercial banks), is at the center of the problem. The2 2
key issue is a mismatch of assets and liabilitites: a country’s financial system is
internationally illiquid if its potential short term obligations in foreign currency exceed
the amount of foreign currency it can have access to on short notice. As we shall discuss
later (and we have argued at length in Chang and Velasco 1998a, b), the concept of
international illiquidity is crucial for it involves a fragile situation: it is a necessary and
sufficient condition for financial crashes and/or balance of payments crises.
2. The illiquidity of the financial system is almost always rooted in a previous bout of
financial liberalization, which accentuates the maturity mismatch between international
assets and liabilities. In addition, capital flows from abroad, caused by an opening of the
capital account and/or falls in world interest rates, magnify the problem by making
available huge amounts of resources that can be intermediated by domestic banks. If short
in maturity, as they were in the latter stages of the Mexican and Asian episodes,
additional foreign loans can sharply increase the vulnerability of domestic banks: a
creditors' panic, that is, a creditors' refusal to roll over these short term loans, may render
a self-fulfilling bank run possible.
3. Bad policy, in the conventional sense of unsustainably large, money-financed deficits,
is not to blame. A striking fact shared by Chile 82, Mexico 94 and Asia 97 is that
governments in all of them were running either surpluses or small deficits. The problem
may only become fiscal ex post, in the sense that the cost of the bailout deteriorates the
fiscal position.3 3
4. The collapse of fixed exchange rates occurs because stabilizing banks and keeping the
exchange rate peg become mutually incompatible objectives. To help the banks, the
Central Bank must pursue an expansionary policy, either to keep interest rates from rising
(and further wreck the banks) or to provide lender-of-last-resort funds. But in either case
private agents will use the additional  domestic currency to buy reserves, eventually
causing the collapse of the fixed exchange rate. It is in this sense that we observe "twin
crises": a financial crisis and a balance of payments crisis.
5.  The punishment is much larger than the crime. Moderately weak fundamentals
(especially real exchange rate overvaluation) and small changes in exogenous
circumstances (terms of trade, world interest rates) can cause large changes in asset prices
and economic activity. The magnifying mechanism is the financial system, whose
collapse causes costly asset liquidation and an unnecessarily large credit crunch.
In previous work (Chang and Velasco 1998 a,b) we have discussed the theoretical aspects
of classic financial crises in open economies.1 In this paper we shall argue that, by and large, the
recent Asian crises fit the patterns just described and resemble in many ways the experience of
countries like Chile in 1982 and Mexico in 1994. Fiscal policy was cautious in the preceding
years. While real fundamentals such as the real exchange rate and the current account deficit, did
weaken in the run-up to the crises, the degree to which this happened varied substantially across
                                                          
1Our view of crises has been heavily influenced by the previous work of Guillermo Calvo; in particular, see Calvo
(1995, 1996). A partial and chronological list of other papers discussing factors relevant to this view includes
Díaz-Alejandro (1985), Velasco (1987), Dornbusch, Goldfajn and Valdés (1995), Calvo and Mendoza (1996),
Frankel and Rose (1996), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996a, b, and c), Sachs
(1997), Goldfajn and Valdés (1997), Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998) and Radelet and Sachs (1998).4 4
the Asian economies in trouble. What these countries had in common, and to a striking degree,
was a situation of international illiquidity evidenced by sharply rising ratios of hard currency
short term liabilities to liquid assets. As such, they were extremely vulnerable to a reversal of
capital inflows, which occured (and massively) in the second half of 1997. Bankruptcies,
payments moratoria and asset price collapses (including the exchange rate, the price of domestic
money) proliferated. The financial panic fed on itself, causing foreign creditors to call in loans
and depositors to withdraw funds from banks --all of which magnified the illiquidity of domestic
financial institutions and forced yet another round of costly asset liquidation and price deflation.
This financial fragility had its roots in inappropriate microeconomic policies followed
during previous years. As we document below, financial liberalization measures in Asia resulted
in a deterioration of the international liquidity position of the financial system, much as it
happened in Chile and Mexico. These measures, carried out at a time of large capital inflows,
created the conditions for a crisis. Much of the borrowing was in dollars and, especially in the
period right before the crisis, short term. These two factors left domestic banks exposed to
exchange risk and to the mood swings of lenders who had to roll over large loan volumes at short
intervals.
The financial nature of the Asian crisis has confronted policymakers with a number of
difficult tradeoffs in designing an appropiate response. The potential conflicts had, once again,
been confronted by some of the financially distressed Latin countries. One difficulty has to do
with the management of monetary policy and the exchange rate. On the one hand, loose money
(much of it aimed at supplying liquidity to banks) may help forestall the panic and a depreciated
exchange rate may improve competitiveness; on the other, depreciation fears may feed on
themselves and spiral out of control, making it increasingly expensive for domestic firms to5 5
service foreign currency-denominated loans. A second conundrum has to do with how forcefully
to proceed in closing insolvent banks and forcing weak ones to recapitalize. Swift bank closures
minimize moral hazard dangers but, if depositors have difficulty distinguishing sound from
unsound institutions, may trigger runs on healthy banks. Forced recapitalization (expressed in
higher capital/asset ratios) may force banks to curtail credit, in turn exacerbating the illiquidity of
troubled borrowers and possibly worsening the quality of banks' loan portfolios.
Finally, the recent wave of financial meltdowns forces us to revisit some policy lessons
for emerging markets.  The first has to do with the dangers of fixed exchange rates in a context of
large capital inflows and potential financial fragility. The second stresses the fragility of financial
liberalization that is not coupled with much-improved regulatory oversight. The third ponders the
potential benefits of policies that discourage short-term foreign borrowing, particularly by
domestic banks. The fourth underscores the importance of an international lender of last resort in
circumstances in which coordination failure on the part of creditors can cause a bank and/or a
balance of payments crisis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses two cases of crises, Chile 1982
and Mexico 1994, that in many ways resemble recent Asian episodes. Section III reviews the
“conventional” macroeconomic fundamentals in Asian countries before their recent crises.
Section IV presents the key concept of international illiquidity and discusses its relation to crises.
Section V examines evidence showing that such a condition did in fact characterize the Asian
pre-crisis situation. Section VI discusses three factors (financial liberalization, shortening of the
foreign debt structure, and the currency denomination of assets and liabilities) that explain how
the Asian countries became internationally illiquid. Section VII discusses how the potential for a6 6
crisis implied by international illiquidity translated into an actual financial crash and the collapse
of fixed exchange rates in Asia. Section VIII concludes and discusses lessons for policy.
II. The Precedent from Latin America: Chile 1982 and Mexico 19942
Before their respective crises in 1982 and 1994, Chile and Mexico were seen as examples
of successful economic reform. The two were highly market-oriented economies that had
liberalized internal and external markets, and had gone through successful stabilization,
deregulation and  privatization of state owned enterprises. Tables 1 and 2 show some results.
Economic growth was impressive in Chile and moderate in Mexico; in both countries, inflation
was falling. Most importantly, they were both paragons of fiscal rectitude, having rectified the
fiscal populism of earlier governments. Chile ran a fiscal surplus every year between (and
including) 1976 and 1981. Similarly, Mexico's operational balance was in surplus every year
between 1990 and 1994.3
International markets amply rewarded both countries by for their virtuous behavior.
Capital inflows were massive, averaging more than 6.7% of Mexican GDP in 1990-1994. The
large inflows pushed the real exchange rate up, as shown by Tables 1 and 2. Chile's appreciation
was 30 percent between 1978 (the year an exchange-rate stabilization was adopted) and year-end
1981. Estimates for Mexico's varied, but common opinion put the real appreciation accumulated
                                                          
2This section draws on Velasco (1987) and (1991),  Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996b) and Velasco and Cabezas
(1998).
3The operational balance is the public sector borrowing requirement minus the inflationary component of debt
payments. There was some debate in 1995 about whether the actual Mexican deficit was higher in 1994, if lending
by state development banks was added. We do not believe so, since this lending was on commercial terms and often
against collateral, it does not belong in an economic measure of the deficit. For a more detailed discussion see Sachs,
Tornell and Velasco (1996b).7 7
in 1988-1993 at 15-20%. In neither country was there agreement that the observed appreciation
constituted misalignment. Both governments (and many observers) argued that the bulk of such
relative price changes was an equilibrium phenomenon, due to trade liberalization, deregulation
and other competitivenes-enhancing structural reforms. The current account deteriorated
nonetheless, and reached alarming proportions in both countries (14% of GDP in Chile in 1991,
nearly 7% in Mexico in 1994). But markets seemed not to mind, and capital inflows continued at
constant (and even falling) interest rate spreads until shortly before the collapse. As a result, and
in spite of the large external deficits, international reserves were rising until late 1981 in Chile,
and early 1994 in Mexico.
During the upswing, domestic financial markets boomed. This was a result of both
deregulation and the intermediation of large capital inflows from abroad. Both countries
privatized their largest banks --Chile in the mid-1970 and Mexico in the early 1990s-- while
engaging in a fully-fledged round of financial liberalization. Interest rate ceilings were abolished,
required reserve ratios lowered, regulations concerning foreign-currency denominated assets and
liabilites relaxed, boundaries between banks and other financial institutions re-drawn. Indicators
of "financial deepening," such as the ratio of M2 to GDP, rose quickly. So did lending by both
banks and non-banks: in Chile the share of financial system loans to the private sector in  GDP
rose from 5 percent in 1974 to over 82 percent in 1982; for Mexico this share went from 26
percent in 1991 to 41 percent in 1994 (see Table 3). Predictably, asset prices boomed in both
countries. The real stock price index nearly quadrupled in Chile in the three years after 1978;
similarly, prices of land and urban real estate skyrocketed.
Several factors --which reappear with a vengeance in the more recent experience of Asian
countries-- conspired to transform the financial boom into a particularly dangerous phenomenon.8 8
The first was the currency denomination of assets and liabilities. Domestic banks borrowed
abroad and in foreign currency, and also took an increasing stock of dollar denominated deposits
at home. In turn, they lent at home, mostly in domestic currency. This meant that banks were very
exposed to exchange risk --not a concern early on when promises to sustain fixed exchange rates
indefinitely enjoyed some credibility, but troublesome later when devaluations became a fact. It
also meant that central banks were hindered in their ability to serve as lenders of last resort vis a
vis the domestic financial system: monetary authorities could print pesos but not dollars, and
their own reserves of foreign currency were limited.
A second factor was the large (and, over time, growing) share of short term loans abroad.
What is striking is that, in spite all the bullish rhetoric about successful economic reform, long
term flows (including foreign investment) constituted a small portion, while short term portfolio
flows took the lion's share: Table 4 shows that the behavior of private capital inflows was largely
dominated by non-FDI flows, which are likely to reflect the ins and outs of hot money . In
Mexico short-term borrowing was, in addition, a large problem for the government; this matters
because, if the government is called upon to serve as lender of last resort to the banks, the real
resources available for this purpose are its international reserves net of the short term government
liabilities which may be called in at a time of trouble. As Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996a)
discuss in some detail, government debt arose not because of fiscal deficits, but because of the
Bank of Mexico's attempt to sterilize capital inflows starting in 1990. Then, when world interest
rates rose in 1994, the authorities attempted to play on a very steep yield curve, borrowing short
on the expectation that the international rate hike (compounded domestically by increased
political risk) would be temporary. The Mexican government's inability to roll over its large9 9
stock of short term debt (in particular, the infamous Tesobonos) was to prove key in triggering
the financial crisis in December 1994.
In both Chile 82 and Mexico 94, the net effect of the trends just described was to make
their financial system internationally illiquid: short term claims on the consolidated financial
system (including the Central Bank), either in foreign currency or readily convertible to foreign
currency at the fixed exchange rate, far exceeded available liquid resources. As we discuss in
more detail below, illiquidity is partially captured by the ratio of M2 to international reserves;
Table 5 reveals that this ratio not only exceeded one in both cases, but it also rose rapidly in the
buildup to the crisis.
In both cases,  the boom in financial intermediation continued unabated, in spite of some
deterioration of fundamentals,  until a sharp break in expectations. The loss of confidence was
partially triggered by exogenous events, such as the 1982 South Atlantic War and the 1994
political violence in Mexico, and precipitated a reversal in the direction of capital flows. In both
cases, and particularly in Mexico, the degree to which the eventual collapse seems to have been
unanticipated by investors is striking. Interest rate spreads on Mexican assets, for instance, were
essentially constant between March 1994 and the outburst of the crisis in December.4  
Authorities reacted to the mounting troubles in similar ways. On the one hand, they were
extremely reluctant to give up the fixed exchange rate systems on which so much credibility and
so much political capital had been invested. The Central Bank of Chile and the Bank of Mexico
spent large quantities of reserves defending the peg and held on to the bitter end. Mexico, for
instance, allowed its international reserves to fall from nearly US $30 billion in early 1994 to US
$6 billion at the end of the year.1 10 0
On the other hand, central banks were hindered in their defense of the peg by the fragility
of banks, and by the expectation on the part of the public (correctly, it turned out), that growing
bank losses would be partially monetized. The Bank of Mexico recognized as much in its 1995
Monetary Program, arguing that if capital outflows had not been sterilized (by increasing
domestic credit), "interest rates would have reached exorbitant levels, which would have affected
debtors, including financial intermediaries, in an unfavorable way." (Banco de Mexico, 1995).
Liquidity crises occured in both countries. Emblematic of the liquidity squeeze was the
Mexican government's inability to find new takers for its maturing tens of billions of dollars in
short-term bonds, forcing several auctions to be canceled. 5  In Mexico, the abandonment of the
peg, which finally came in late December, contributed to worsen investor's expectations even
further. A financial panic set in.
The abandonment of the fixed parities brought into the open the financial crises that had
been long in the making. Bank deposits fell as investors rushed to restructure their portfolios
away from peso-denominated assets. Open bank runs were only prevented by the blanket
government guarantees on deposits. As mentioned earlier, in the case of Mexico a run on
government debt did take place, with investors refusing to roll-over short-term bonds as they
matured. Asset prices took a spectacular hit, with the stock market falling precipitously in both
instances.
In the aftermath of the crash, domestic banks were revealed to be in very bad shape.
Sharp devaluations and the fall in economic activity did much harm to bank health. As Table 6
reveals, the share of  non-performing loans in bank assets rose sharply. In Chile bank troubles
                                                                                                                                                                                          
4See Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996b) for more details.
5See Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996b) for more details.1 11 1
forced the government to take direct action. By early 1983, 11 commercial banks (including the
country's 2 largest private commercial banks) and 5 finance companies (so called financieras)
were under government intervention or had been liquidated.6 In both countries sizeable programs
of loan rescheduling for debtors and asset swaps with troubled banks were implemented by the
authorities. The total costs of these bailouts remain unclear, but they have been estimated to be as
high as 12% of GDP for Mexico and 20% for Chile.
One last peculiar feature of these episodes concerns the behavior of output and asset
prices. Financial turmoil, a sharp credit crunch and high interest rates took a large toll: output fell
by 14.2 percent in Chile and nearly 7 percent in Mexico in the year of their respective crises.
Pessimism was ripe, and for the same reasons as in Asia today: talk of inefficient investments,
excessive allocation of capital toward the non-traded goods sector (shopping malls, luxury office
buildings and the like), lack of transparency, corruption, etc. A protracted recession was
commonly forecasted. But these pessimistic expectations were wide off the mark. After a decline
of about a year or so, both economies began growing very quickly, with Chile's expanding by 4.8
% per annum between 1984 and 1987, and Mexico expanding by an average of 6.1% in 1996-
1997. Asset prices recovered rapidly as well.
III.  Macroeconomic Fundamentals in East Asia
The classic Krugman (1979) model blamed money-financed budget deficits for reserve
erosion and the eventual collapse of an exchange rate peg. This focus corresponded well to the
facts in some  currency crisis in emerging markets --Mexico in 1976 and Argentina, Brazil, Peru
                                                          
6See Velasco (1990) for details.1 12 2
and (again) Mexico in the early and mid-1980s-- which could readily be attributed to fiscal
irresponsibility. A first and striking characteristic of the Asian economies is that their fiscal
performances were rather far from this conventional account --and rather close to the Chilean and
Mexican experience discussed in the previous section.
Table 7 summarizes the conventional macroeconomic fundamentals in the so called
Asean-5 countries – Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, the countries
hardest affected by recent crises. Moderate fiscal deficits in a few countries (Korea, Malaysia,
especially the Philippines) in the early 1990s were virtually eliminated by 1996.  In fact, these
countries were so prudent that they were often lauded for their tightening fiscal policy in
response to capital inflows and incipient overheating.7
Two other reassuring features of the Asian economies resulted from this strong fiscal
stance. The first (see Table 8) is that public debt as a share of GDP was low, both if compared to
other emerging markets and to OECD countries. The other is that monetary growth could be kept
reasonably tight, resulting in low inflation: Table 7 shows that inflation in the nineties was held
at 10 percent or below, with no clear tendency to increase in any of the countries. Finally,
international reserves were either stable or growing in all countries, as shown by Table 9. In
short, we have a picture far removed from the crisis syndrome described by the so-called "first
generation" models à la Krugman.
Also revealing is the behavior of output in the Asean-5 countries. Some currency crises --
especially the ERM collapse of 1992-- have been blamed on stagnation and mounting
unemployment, which arguably undermined the credibility of fixed exchange rates and
eventually caused a run by panicky investors trying to protect themselves from an impending1 13 3
devaluation.8 It has even been argued that models in this “second generation” can explain the
1994 episode in Mexico, where the combination of a slow-growing economy and a highly
contested presidential election probably kept the authorities from raising interest rates enough to
defend the peg. Anyway, the current Asian episode could not be more different. As Table 7
shows, Asian growth rates were very fast throughout the 1990s, including 1996. In this they
resemble Chile in the early 1980s, where growth averaged 7.9 percent in the five years leading to
the 1982 crash.
As shown by Table 7, the Asean-5 countries saved a lot, and invested even more.
Correspondingly, their current accounts were generally in deficit, as seen in Table 10. The
interpretation of this performance was and remains ambiguous. While there is no clear theoretical
reason why sustained current account imbalances should lead to a crisis, in the aftermath of the
Mexican 1994 collapse both private investors and Washington multilaterals have regarded
deficits exceeding a rule of thumb threshold (often 5% of GDP) as a source of potential trouble.
But the caveats are many. Table 10 shows that the Asian economies did indeed post some large
deficits in 1990-96, but the deficits are only very large (systematically above 5 percent) in
Malaysia and Thailand. Paradoxically, Korea and Indonesia, arguably the hardest hit by the crisis,
had the smaller deficits.9 Moreover, formal econometric work fails to confirm the validity of the
5% rule of thumb. In the Frankel and Rose (1996) study of 117 currency crises, the current
account is no larger on average in crisis times than in tranquil times. Sachs, Tornell and Velasco
(1996c) also find that the current account is a poor predictor of trouble --in their case, of which
countries were hit by the 1995 Tequila effect.
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8 See Obstfeld (1994).1 14 4
Sustained current account deficits may become "unsustainable" once accumulated foreign
debt becomes large10 but, as Table 11 shows, total foreign debt levels were moderate for all
Asian countries in the sample except for Indonesia – and even Indonesia’s debt was not
substantially greater than that of comparable countries. Latin countries such as Chile and Peru
ran much higher current account deficits in the 1990s, and had similar or worse debt situations,
but nonetheless came out unscathed.
Several observers contend that the Asian current account deficits were problematic in that
they were caused by a loss of competitiveness. This view is consistent with the behavior of the
real exchange rate: as Table 12 shows, most of the Asean-5 economies experienced appreciation
relative to 1990. This tendency sharpened in late 1995, as the US dollar (to which these countries'
currencies where de facto or de jure pegged) gained on the japanese yen.11
Real exchange rate appreciation is in fact a good predictor of currency crises in the
making, as found for instance by Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996b) and Frankel and Rose
(1996).  Yet several caveats are in order to interpret the Asean-5 data. The first is that there is a
great deal of heterogeneity accross country experiences. Numbers for the period between 1990
and year-end 1996 range from a 13% real depreciation for Korea to a 16 real appreciation for the
Philippines. A second is the usual question of  whether the observed appreciations do reflect
misalignment. For standard Balassa-Samuelson reasons, one would expect rapidly growing
economies such as these to experience substantial equilibrium appreciation, and that is precisely
                                                                                                                                                                                          
9Notice that, in addition, average current account deficits in Indonesia hardly changed from the 1980s to the 1990s.
10Current account sustainability is a notion that is conceptually unimpeachable but practically of little use, for it
requires that one calculate present values of sequences of unknown future flows. Observed ratios of total debt to
GDP provide a very imperfect measure of sustainabilty.
11The data in this table are from J.P. Morgan. Radelet and Sachs (1998) compute larger real appreciations.1 15 5
what more careful studies show. 12 The third caveat comes from comparisons with other
countries as well as other times, which suggest that real appreciation in Asia was not a such a
large problem. Table 12 shows that, in the last decade, emerging economies such as  Argentina,
Brazil and Chile experienced much greater appreciations, yet no crisis struck. Also, Table 12
shows that the change in the real exchange rate in the Asean-5 countries is much smaller if the
reference point is taken to be 1988 or 1989 instead of 1990. All of this suggests that real
overvaluation in Asia was neither so large  nor a sufficient condition to trigger a financial crash.
Finally, the deterioration of conventional fundamentals in Asia seems too small to explain
the magnitude of the subsequent crisis. As Calvo and Mendoza (1996) suggested about Mexico,
we are skeptical that the size of the punishment was justified by the hideousness of the sins. As
estimated by Sachs and Radelet (1998), the Asian economies experienced a capital outflow of
US$ 34 bn. in the second half of 1997, equivalent to a negative shock of 3.6 percent of GDP.
Growth has fallen from highly positive to negative. Currencies trade for as little as twenty five
percent of their mid 1997 vis a vis the US dollar; the prices of stocks and real estate have fallen
just as far. It is hard to understand the magnitude of this collapse without reference to the severe
turmoil in the Asian financial sector. To that subject we now turn.
                                                          
12 In particular, ,   Chinn (1998) estimates a structural model of real exchange rate determination and finds that, once
one corrects for underlying structural change, the extent of misalignment is quite limited, and smaller than the real
appreciation numbers in Table 12 suggest.1 16 6
IV. International Illiquidity and Financial Crises
Financial collapse has clearly been the most spectacular aspect of the Asian meltdown.13
Bank failures and closures have taken place in each of the Asean-5 nations. In Indonesia, 16
commercial banks were closed; in Korea, 14 out of 30 merchant banks were suspended; in
Thailand non-bank finance companies were the source of trouble, in an echo of the 1982 Chilean
story: 58 out of 91 such firms had their operations stopped, with almost all of them scheduled for
liquidation.
In Thailand, Korea and Indonesia, domestic financial institutions (and in Indonesia non-
financial firms) came to the brink of default on their external short-term obligations. For Korea
and Thailand, default was prevented by an emergency rescheduling of  liabilities. Indonesia had
to declare an effective moratorium on debt service by its corporate sector in January 1998.
Financial collapse has been closely linked to the plunge in asset prices. Growing non-
performing loans and capital losses caused by currency depreciation sharply reduced bank
capital. Banks were forced to sell assets and curtail lending in order to move toward capital-
adequacy ratios required by regulators and the IMF.14 In turn, the asset price plunge worsened
bank capital shortages in those cases (particularly Korea)  in which banks were allowed to hold
some of their capital in stocks of other companies.
And financial collapse has been a prime cause of the sharp currency depreciations
observed since mid-1997. Corsetti, Roubini and Pesenti (1998) document the paradoxical fact
that several of the Asean-5 nations pursued low-interest rate policies until well into the crisis.
                                                          
13 A Goldman Sachs report issued in December 1997 ranked and quantified the fragility of financial systems in the
region. An index of of 12 factors of fragility --including destabilizing financial liberalization, rapidly rising credit-to-
GDP ratio, high foreign currency liabilities, weak capital or loan reserve levels, and under-regulated non-bank
financial institutions-- gave a score of 22 (against a worst possible score of 24) to Thailand and Korea, and 20 to
Indonesia, 15 to Malaysia and 14 to the Philippines.1 17 7
Malaysia, for instance, waited until the ringitt had fallen by over 40% vis à vis the dollar before
tightening its monetary stance in December 1997. In addition, in some cases such as Thailand's,
monetary authorities injected large amounts of resources into failing financial institutions,
creating unwanted domestic currency that private agents were quick to try to turn into hard
currency. Clearly, fragile and illiquid banks prevented Central Banks from raising interest rates
sufficiently to defend their exchange rate pegs; but this could last only until international reserves
were exhausted, at which point the pegs had to be abandoned and exchange rates plummeted. In
addition, in some cases such as Thailand's, monetary authorities injected large amounts of
resources into failing financial institutions, creating unwanted domestic currency that private
agents were quick to try to turn into hard currency.
In short, a main outcome of the Asian recent crisis has been a collapse of their financial
systems. This observation suggests that the explanation of the crisis must also be financial in
nature. Consequently, several “financial” theories have been proposed to explain the Asian crash,
each emphasizing a particular element of an obviously complex financial reality. In our view,
both theory and evidence strongly indicate that the vulnerability of financial systems in the region
resulted from their international illiquidity.
The concept of international illiquidity will be the key organizing principle in the
remainder of our analysis.  It refers to a maturity mismatch of a financial system’s international
assets and liabilities. More precisely, we will say that a country’s financial system is
internationally illiquid if its potential short term obligations in foreign currency exceed the
amount of foreign currency it can have access to on short notice. This concept is crucial
international illiquidity  involves a fragile situation: it is a necessary and sufficient condition for
                                                                                                                                                                                          
14See Sachs and Radelet (1998) for a detailed description of this process.1 18 8
financial crashes and/or balance of payments crises. To see this, next we discuss a very stylized
model that illustrates the role of international illiquidity in the genesis of financial crises. The
setup here is a much simplified version of that analyzed in Chang and Velasco (1998a and b).
Let us focus on a small open economy populated by ex ante identical agents. There are
three periods of interest: a planning period (t = 0), a “short run” (t=1), and the “long run” (t = 2).
There is a composite consumption good whose price in the world market is fixed over time and
normalized to one “dollar”.
Each domestic agent has an endowment e > 0 of consumption in the planning period.
However, she only consumes in the other two periods, and for simplicity we assume that she is
indifferent about whether she consumes in the short run or the long run. To provide for future
consumption, domestic residents have access to two kinds of assets. First, they can invest in the
world market, where the net interest rate is fixed at zero. Domestic residents can also borrow in
the world market, but subject to a debt limit denoted by d > 0.  Second, domestic agents have
access to a technology whose yield is large in the long run but small in the short run. Each dollar
invested in this technology in the planning period yields R > 1 units of consumption in the long
run, but only r < 1 if liquidated in the short run.
We will assume that, because of indivisibilities or other reasons not explicitly modeled
here, domestic agents cannot exploit the long term technology if acting individually, but they can
if they act collectively. As a consequence, domestic agents will form coalitions or banks, which
will be assumed to offer demand deposits. A demand deposit is a contract by which a depositor
surrenders to the bank her endowment e and her capacity to borrow d. In exchange, she gets the
right to withdraw either her initial deposit (e dollars) in the short run, or a larger amount, say y1 19 9
dollars, in the long run.15 In turn, each bank uses the deposits and the borrowing capacity thus
obtained to invest in either the world asset or the long run asset, in order to service withdrawals
and maximize profits. We shall assume that any bank must hold at least b > 0 dollars per
depositor in liquid form (that is, in the world asset). This may be due to the existence of reserve
requirements; alternatively, b may represent the foreign reserves of the Central Bank, if we are
considering the consolidated banking system.
If banks are competitive, profits will be driven to zero and demand deposits will be
designed so as to maximize the utility of the representative depositor. It is not hard to see that
this implies at least three conditions:
·  First, the bank’s initial investment in the world asset will be as low as possible: since
depositors are indifferent about short run and long run consumption in, they are better served
by investing in the long run, higher yield asset. So the (per depositor) initial investment in the
world asset will be exactly b.
 
·  Second, the typical bank will borrow all it can in the world market. This is because the world
cost of credit is zero, while the bank can obtain a positive yield (equal to R-1) on the long run
investment. Hence the bank will borrow d (per depositor) in the world market in the planning
period. Since each domestic agent will deposit her endowment e in the banking system and
                                                          
15 While the existence of demand deposits (as opposed to other kinds of contracts between depositors and banks) is
simply assumed here, it can easily be derived from first principles. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show they emerge
optimally in an environment in which depositors’ liquidity needs are stochastic, and in which secondary markets for
illiquid assets are not present. Diamond (1997) shows that even if such secondary markets are present, banks offering
demand deposits perform a useful social function as long as participation in secondary markets is limited.2 20 0
the bank invests b dollars per depositor in the world asset, the investment in the long run
asset will be k = e+d-b per depositor.
 
·  Third, since profits are zero, the bank will distribute all of its value to depositors in the long
run. Hence y will equal the bank’s resources after repaying its foreign debt, which are given
by Rk+b – d .
Given the above expressions for y and k, it follows that y = Re + (R-1)(d-b). Since R > 1,
y > e if b is not too large. An implication is that domestic residents will find it more
advantageous to join a bank than to act in isolation. More importantly, a banking system may
emerge in this economy as a socially desirable mechanism. The typical bank will offer demand
deposits, borrow in the world market, and allocate investment in order to maximize profits; in so
doing, the banking system will improve social welfare.
This analysis is subject to one caveat, however. The caveat is that we have implicitly
assumed that the holders of the bank’s liabilities, domestic depositors and foreign creditors all
remain confident in the bank. This assumption ensures that depositors do not attempt to withdraw
their deposits in the short run, and that (assuming that the initial external debt is only for one
period) foreign creditors roll over their initial credit d in the short run. By construction, the bank
will be able to honor all its commitments if confidence is maintained. But what happens if
confidence is lost? In that case, a crisis may happen and the bank may fail.
To see this, suppose that the initial credit d contracted in the planning period is a short
term credit that needs to be renewed at t = 1.  Suppose, further, both domestic depositors and
foreign creditors “panic” and believe that the bank will fail. In that case, all depositors will2 21 1
attempt to withdraw e and foreign creditors demand repayment of the credit d. What resources
can the bank use to meet these demands? In the planning period, the bank had allocated b to
liquid assets, and k = e+d-b to the illiquid asset. But if b < e+d, the value of the world
investment will not be sufficient to meet the demands of depositors and foreign creditors. This
means that the bank will have to liquidate some of the long term asset, which is costly. In fact,
even this will not prevent the bank’s failure if e + d > b + rk, that is, if the bank’s potential short
run obligations (given by the RHS) exceed the resources it can have access to in the short run
(given by the LHS).  The inequality just stated is crucial and corresponds to what we have called
international illiquidity.16
Several points are worth noting:
·  Banks may perform a useful social function even if liquid. In this simple model, feasible
consumption by the representative depositor rises if  y>e. It is easy to check that this requires
that b<d+e, which is intuitive: if banks reserve too heavily, then they forego the opportunity
to invest in the productive long term asset. On the other hand, illiquidity requires e + d > b +
rk. Hence, we can have b<e + d < b + rk, and enjoy banks that are both welfare-enhancing
and invulnerable to confidence crises. Note that this best of all possible worlds is even more
readily achievable if agents are risk averse (as in the original Diamond-Dybvig model), so
that banks also raise welfare by permitting risk-pooling.
                                                          
16 It is important to note that banks may perform a useful social function even if not illiquid. In this simple model,
feasible consumption by the representative depositor rises if  y>e. It is easy to check that this requires that b<d+e,
which is intuitive: if banks reserve too heavily, then they forego the opportunity to invest in the productive long term
asset. On the other hand, illiquidity requires e + d > b + rk. Hence, we can have b<e + d < b + rk, and enjoy banks
that are both welfare-enhancing and invulnerable to confidence crises. Note that this best of all possible worlds is
even more readily achievable if agents are risk averse (as in the original Diamond-Dybvig model), so that banks also
raise welfare by permitting risk-pooling.2 22 2
·  If the financial system is illiquid, a crisis may occur when it could have been prevented: as
we have seen, the demand deposit system would have been successful if depositors had not
tried to withdraw their deposits and foreign creditors had rolled over their loans. Second, the
cost of a crisis may be very large: in the event of a crisis, the economy’s wealth shrinks to
b+rk = b+r(e+d-b)= (1-r)b + r(e+d), which can be much smaller than the initial investment
e+d if b and r are small.
 
·  In general, a crisis may be due to a loss of confidence by domestic depositors, foreign
creditors, or both. If b + rk < e, a domestic depositors’ panic is enough to cause a crisis. But
it is possible that e < b+rk < e + d. In such case, a crisis can only occur if both depositors
and foreign lenders panic. If a crisis then occurs, foreign creditors pull out of the country
because they fear a domestic bank run, which itself occurs because domestic depositors know
that foreign loans will not be renewed.
 
·  The key definition of international illiquidity depends on the maturity characteristics of assets
and liabilities. So far we have implicitly assumed that loans d are short term, in the sense that
they have to be rolled over in period 1. Suppose, by contrast, that the banking system has the
option to borrow d in the planning period as a long term loan. In that case, in the short run
only domestic depositors can demand repayment of their claims on banks. The international
illiquidity condition is now that e > b+rk; while this means that a crisis may still be possible,
this condition is less likely to be satisfied than in the previous case of only short term foreign2 23 3
debt. An immediate implication is that crises may become more likely if the average maturity
of foreign debt becomes shorter.
We have discussed these and other points at length in our theoretical papers (Chang and
Velasco 1998a, b). Next we examine whether international illiquidity did in fact play a role in the
Asian crisis.
V. Financial Illiquidity in the Asian Crisis
Given the theory outlined in the preceding section, an obvious question is whether the
Asean 5 countries were internationally illiquid at the time their crises erupted. Answering this
requires making the concept of   “international illiquidity” operational, which requires identifying
the institutions that comprise a country’s   “financial system,” as well as their relevant   “short
term assets and liabilities in foreign currency.” The appropriate definitions depend on
government policy.
Our definition of a financial system will naturally include domestic banks and other
domestic financial entities that perform bank-like operations (such as Thailand’s finance
companies). In addition, because Asian governments were committed to act as lenders of last
resort of private financial institutions, the Asian central banks will be included as well.  This
inclusion is justified because, in the presence of such a commitment, a crisis affecting private
financial institutions will force a central bank to honor it, which may pull the government itself
into the crisis. Indeed, we shall argue later that a balance of payments crisis is best understood as2 24 4
a situation in which a central bank runs out of international liquidity in an attempt to fight a
financial crisis. 
Accordingly, an ideal definition of the liquid international assets of the financial system
would include not only the short term external assets of private financial institutions, but also the
amount of foreign currency available to the central bank for last resort lending in the event of a
crisis. (Notice that the latter should, in principle, exclude the amount of reserves that has already
been committed, implicitly or explicitly, to other uses in a crisis, such as the repayment of
Tesobonos in Mexico 94.) The definition would also include the amount of international loans
that the financial system can have access to in the short run as well as the liquidation value of
fixed assets. While a measure of short term international liquid assets embodying these
desiderata can perhaps be constructed, because of data constraints we use the stock of
international reserves of the monetary authorities to proxy such an ideal measure.
Similarly, an ideal definition of the short term international liabilities of the financial
system would include its short term foreign debt as well as demandable deposits denominated in
foreign currency; the only difference, from the viewpoint of international illiquidity, is that the
former are obligations against foreigners while the latter are obligations with domestic residents.
In addition, if there is a fixed exchange rate, demandable deposits in domestic currency should
also be included, since fixed rates imply that such deposits are effectively obligations in foreign
currency. The relevant  data on deposits in the consolidated financial system are available from
IFS, but the situation for international debt is less satisfactory. As discussed by Corsetti, Pesenti,
and Roubini (1998), the most useful source of evidence on short term external debt is published
by the Bank of International Settlements. One observation about BIS data is that it is restricted to
indebtedness of a country’s residents against foreign banks. More importantly for our purposes,2 25 5
available BIS tables are not broken down sufficiently to identify the short term external debt of
the financial system. However, they do contain data on the short term external debt (against BIS
reporting banks) of a country as a whole, as well as on the amount of external debt (including
debt of longer maturity) contracted by domestic banks. These aspects of the data force us to treat
domestic deposits and external debt separately.
In spite of the data limitations just noted, the evidence on the Asean-5 countries does
suggest that the international liquidity position of their financial systems deteriorated before the
crisis. This is can be seen most clearly from the BIS data on foreign bank lending. Table 13
describes the behavior of the ratio of short term loans from international banks to reserves;
obviously, an increase in the ratio implies a higher likelihood of  international illiquidity. The
table shows that the ratio increased between mid 1994 and mid 1997 in every case except for
Indonesia, where the ratio was stable. (In Korea, Malaysia and Thailand the ratio had also
increased between 1990 and 1994. It had fallen in Indonesia but not by much. It had fallen
sharply in the Philippines, but this was probably an anomaly following the Philippine Brady debt
restructuring of 1991.)
It is also notable that the levels of the short term debt to reserves ratio at the end of 1996
were substantially over one in Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand. This suggests a financially fragile
situation, in the sense that international reserves would not have been sufficient to repay the short
term debt had foreign banks decided not to roll it over. While the level of the short term debt to
reserves ratio was below one in Malaysia and the Philippines (the two countries among the Asean
5 least affected by the crisis), it doubled between mid 1994 and mid 1997. A comparison with
Latin American countries is also telling. The short term debt/reserves ratio was stable and below2 26 6
one in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru; in Argentina and Mexico it was 1.2 in mid 1997, thus
exceeding one but not by much, and had been falling.
The BIS tables suggest, in addition, that the proportion of foreign bank lending
intermediated by the domestic banking sector was stable in each case except Thailand. In the case
of Thailand, the decline in the share of the domestic banking sector in foreign borrowing is
attributable, by and large, to the increased importance of finance companies. Finance companies
seem to have emerged in response to regulatory distortions, but performed bank-like functions. In
fact, they are included in the International Finance Statistics as part of the group “Other Banking
Institutions;” the IFS notes that although finance companies were “not licensed to accept deposits
from the public,” they “issued promissory notes at terms comparable to the time deposits at
commercial banks.” 17 The importance of Thailand’s finance companies in the financial systems
was also underscored by the fact that the Bank of Thailand was commited to support them as a
lender of last resort. 18
The evidence thus strongly indicates that the short term external liabilities of the financial
system were growing faster than its liquid international assets. In our interpretation, this trend
deteriorated the international liquidity position of the Asean 5 countries to the point where a loss
of confidence from foreign creditors could bring the financial system to a crisis.
The behavior of domestic deposits vis a vis international reserves suggests a similar
picture. Table 14 shows the evolution of the ratio of M2 to foreign reserves for the Asian 5
economies before their crises. The high level of the M2/reserves ratio seems consistent with the
hypothesis of international illiquidity.  At the end of 1996, the M2/reserves ratio was almost
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seven in Korea and Indonesia and 4.5 in the Philippines. At the same time, the same ratio was
only about 3.4 in Argentina and Brazil, and less than two in Chile and Peru. It was higher in
Mexico (4.65) but there it had been falling; it is notable (and maybe more than a coincidence)
that the M2/reserves ratio had been over seven in Mexico in June 1994, just before its own
crisis!.  The M2/reserves ratio in Malaysia was 3.3 at the end of 1994, and hence comparable to
that of Argentina and Brazil; however, the ratio had been increasing.
The M2/reserves ratio was stable or increasing in each of the Asean-5 countries, except in
Thailand where it was falling. The behavior of the Thai ratio most likely reflects, as we discussed
above, that the relevant measure of the liabilities of Thailand’s financial system vis a vis
domestic residents should include the promissory notes of the finance companies, which are not
included in M2 but became increasingly important.
In short, the ratio of M2 to reserves in the Asean-5 countries had been either high or
increasing in each case but Thailand, whose behavior likely reflects the accounting of finance
companies. By contrast, in comparable Latin countries the M2/reserves ratio was relatively high
only in Mexico, where it had been falling drastically. This evidence, which proxies the trends and
levels of the short term asset/liability positions of the Asian financial systems vis a vis domestic
depositors, also strongly favors the view that the Asean-5 countries had a problem of
international illiquidity when the crisis started. It should be repeated that, because the Asean 5
countries had effectively fixed exchange rates, our accounting includes domestic currency
deposits as obligations in international currency.  The relative magnitudes of deposits to
international reserves implies that the latter would not have been sufficient to honor the
outstanding stock of deposits at the fixed exchange rate. Given this condition, a run by domestic
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depositors was bound to result in either the bankruptcy of the financial system or the forced
abandonment of the fixed exchange rate system.
VI. Factors Behind Asian Financial Vulnerability
We have so far argued that the Asean-5 countries were in a state of international
illiquidity, which made them vulnerable to financial crises. An obvious question is: how did they
arrive at such a precarious position? What caused their international liquidity positions to
deteriorate? We believe that three factors were crucial.
1. Financial liberalization prior to the crisis
In the late 1980s and the 1990s the governments of the Asian-5 countries implemented
policies designed to move away from  “financial repression” and towards a freer, more market
oriented financial system. This trend included the deregulation of interest rates and the easing of
reserve requirements on banks; in Korea, for instance, lending interest rates were liberalized
between 1991 and 1993, and marginal reserve requirements, which had been as high as 30
percent around 1990, were reduced to seven percent in 1996. In addition, policies oriented
towards the promotion of competition and entry of financial institutions were enacted:
requirements on the opening and branching of banks were relaxed in Indonesia and Malaysia in
1988-89; restrictions on activities of foreign banks were eased in Korea and Thailand in 1991 and
1993 respectively.19
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financial liberalization in the Asean 5 countries.2 29 9
From our perspective, the crucial implication of liberalization was its effect on the
international liquidity position of the financial system. Existing economic theory suggests that
such effect is detrimental. Clearly, lower reserve requirements allow the banking industry to
maintain a lower degree of liquidity. But, as we have argued elsewhere (Chang and Velasco
1998a, b), while this may be desirable on efficiency grounds, it directly exacerbates international
illiquidity and increases the possibility of financial runs. Likewise, the fostering of competition in
the financial industry may deliver institutions that, while leaner and meaner, are less liquid. In
Chang and Velasco (1998b) we have discussed how this may happen in the banking industry.
Increased competition typically forces banks to offer more attractive terms (higher interest rates)
to depositors. This improves social welfare in the absence of bank runs. But it also implies that
the short term liabilities of the banking system, in this case the face value of demand deposits,
must increase, impairing international liquidity. 
Evidence supporting the view that financial liberalization lowers international liquidity
has been provided recently by Demirguc-Kent and Detragiache (1998). Their analysis of  banking
industry data in eight countries between 1988 and 1995 shows that financial liberalization
(understood as the deregulation of interest rates) is strongly correlated with a fall in the bank’s
liquidity (measured by the ratio of liquid to total assets). While more empirical work is clearly
needed, our assessment of existing theory and evidence is consistent with the view that financial
liberalization in Asia increased the possibility of a financial crash through its effect on
international illiquidity. 20
                                                                                                                                                                                          
20 It must be noted that this view on how liberalization contributed to the Asian crisis differs from other ones that
have been proposed. In particular, an alternative mechanism, suggested by Caprio and Summers (1993) and
Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (1994), is that financial liberalization may have reduced the “franchise value” of
banks and induced them to take on more risk. While this mechanism may have been at work, it is unclear that its3 30 0
2. An unprecedented increase in short term foreign liabilities
Our concept of international illiquidity focuses on the difference between short term
international assets and liabilities. It was the explosive growth of the latter, in particular of short
term international debt, that accounts for the change in the international liquidity position of the
Asean 5 countries.
As emphasized by Sachs and Radelet (1998), a notable feature of the Asian crisis was the
extent to which foreign investors, especially foreign commercial banks, increased their loans to
the Asian-5 economies up to the onset of the crisis. BIS data shows that international bank
lending to Asia increased from less than US$ 150 bn. at the end of 1990 to about US$ 390 bn. in
mid 1997; in contrast, foreign bank lending to Latin America only increased from about US$ 180
bn. to about US$ 250 bn. over the same period.  The bulk of new lending to Asia was directed to
the Asean 5 countries (although the Philippines received a relatively small share). 
In addition, BIS data show that most of the loans by foreign banks were short term ones.
For Asia, the share of loans with maturity over a year fell from about 38 percent in 1990 to less
than 30 percent in mid 1997; the corresponding figure for Latin America stood at 40 percent in
mid 1997. Table 15 shows that, for the Asean 5 countries, short term debt was a larger share of
total debt in mid 1997 than in mid 1990, although its importance was somewhat smaller than in
1994. At the time of the crisis,  short term loans as a share of total obligations to the international
banking community were 68% in Korea, 66% in Thailand, 59% in Indonesia, 56% in Malaysia,
and 59% in the Philippines. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
effects are strong enough to explain the Asian crisis. Also, the evidence about the  franchise value” story is mixed: as
discussed by Demirguc-Kent and Detragiache (1998), the fall in the banking system liquidity associated with
financial liberalization suggests that its franchise value increases, instead of falling, with liberalization.3 31 1
Hence the data shows not only that an unprecedented increase in capital flows towards the
Asean 5 countries took place since 1990, but also that a growing proportion of those flows were
short term ones. As shown by the behavior of the short term debt to international reserves ratio,
these short term capital inflows were not matched by a comparable increase in international
liquid assets, implying that international illiquidity became a more serious problem. 
A key question naturally suggests itself: how did the financial system in the Asean-5
countries end up with so much short term debt? Although a definitive answer remains to be
found, we believe that that the following hypotheses are plausible:
·  Financial liberalization may once again carry part of the blame. As part of the
deregulation and capital account liberalization that took place in the Asean 5
countries, obstacles to capital inflows were reduced --a change which clearly
encouraged total inflows. The remaining question, then, is why short term debt
became relatively more important. One possibility is that, if before the liberalization
governments wanted to encourage foreign direct investment, the barriers that were
reduced basically affected short-term flows. In that case, financial liberalization
clearly would have lead to a rising share of short-term debt.
·  Economic fundamentals may imply that increases in total capital inflows must be
associated with a rising share of short term debt. In our theoretical work (Chang and
Velasco 1998a, b) we have shown that this may be the case in an economy that needs
to obtain short term loans to provide for  today’s consumption, and long term loans to
finance investment projects that mature later. In such a case, an increase in total3 32 2
capital inflows will then be distributed between short and long term debt, in
proportions that depend on specific properties of preferences and technology.
·  Miscalculation and wishful thinking on the part of Asian borrowers may also be to
blame. As the effect of external shocks (dollar appreciation, Chinese devaluation,
stagnation in Japan) made itself felt and  macroeconomic fundamentals deteriorated,
firms and banks may have conjectured that the shocks were temporary, and that
relatively inexpensive short-term borrowing was called for to get over the hump. The
Mexican government did something similar in the course of 1994, attempting to get
through a period of domestic political instability and higher world interest rates by
playing on the yield curve and borrowing short to minimize interest expense. In both
cases the period of turbulence was deeper and longer than had been anticipated, and
ex post the decision to borrow short seems unsound.
·  Finally, supply-side factors may have been at work. A larger share of short term debt
among the Asean 5 countries reflects a worldwide trend towards shorter debt
maturities. The data from the BIS shows that the short term loans as a share of
international bank loans fell from almost 40 percent in mid 1994 to less than 35
percent in mid 1997. This fall reflects similar trends in both developed and
developing countries (although, as discussed earlier, the share of short term debt of
the Asean 5 countries has consistently been well above the world average). It is
conceivable, then, that the shortening of international debt maturities reflects the
relative world supply of short versus long term funds.3 33 3
All of the above hypotheses are theoretically sound and ring true. However, more detailed
work is needed to establish their role in generating the Asian crisis. More generally,  this question
remains a key issue for research.
3.  An increase in foreign-currency debt
In the 1990s not only the maturity but also the currency composition of the liabilities of
the financial system of the Asean-5 countries was conducive to financial fragility. As we saw
above, there was a sharp increase in borrowing abroad which, Table 16 reveals, was
overwhelmingly done in foreign currency. Since the currency composition of the financial
system's domestic liabilities did not change much (dollarization of deposits has been limited in
Asia, in contrast to Latin America), the increase in foreign loans implied also a sharp rise in the
volume of total obligations denominated in foreign currency. 
Why whould domestic financial institutions choose dollar or yen debt over domestic
currency debt? Two explanations stand out. The first is a bias toward foreign borrowing implicit
in the regulatory environment. In the Philippines, for instance, banks are subject to a 10% tax rate
on income from foreign currency loans, while other income is taxed at the regular corporate
income rate of 35%. Philippine banks face reserve requirements of 13% for peso deposits (down
from 16% in 1996), and of zero for foreign currency deposits.21 Offshore or special financial
centers, which dealt exclusively in foreign currency, also distorted incentives faced by borrowers.
Banks operating in the Bangkok International Banking Facility  were eligible for special tax
breaks. The phenomenon was also present elsewhere: "Malaysia promoted Labuan as a financial3 34 4
center, the Philippines developed and off-shore Euro-peso market, and Singapore and Hong-
Kong further developed their roles as regional financial centers. These markets were often given
regulatory and tax advantages...and much external financing was channeled through these
offshore markets."22
A second commonly mentioned culprit is the combination of high domestic interest rates
(often caused by sterilization of capital inflows) plus commitment to a fixed exchange rate. The
Asian Development Bank (1998) documents the large spreads between domestic and foreign
borrowing costs that prompted banks and firms to seek financing abroad. The next question is
why such liabilities were mostly unhedged. Radelet and Sachs (1998) write:  "Nominal exchange
rates were effectively pegged to the US dollar, with either limited variation (Thailand, Malaysia,
Korea, and the Philippines) or very predictable change (Indonesia). Predictable exchange rates
reduced perceived risks for investors, further encouraging capital inflows." In other words: there
was, as we know ex post, a non-trivial risk of nominal and real devaluations, but government
words and deeds lead investors to underestimate such a risk. Economists often fret about
exchange rate pegs that lack credibility; by contrast, Asian pegs seem to have enjoyed too much
credibility. 
Since the run on Mexico's dollar-denominated Tesobonos in December 1994, it has
become fashionable to blame foreign currency-denominated debt for a host of ills --sometimes
with less than full justification. As we stressed above, it is not the case that the ratio of foreign
currency-denominated liquid liabilities to foreign currency-denominated liquid assets is the
proper measure of a financial system's international illiquidity. Under a fixed exchange rate,
                                                                                                                                                                                          
21IMF, "Philippines --Recent Economic Developments", April 1997, cited by Radelet and Sachs (1998).
22Asian Development Bank (1998).3 35 5
domestic currency deposits are no different than dollar or yen liabilities: a depositor withdrawing
pesos or baht or won from a bank should be able to convert them into dollars at the announced
parity, and a liquid system (that is, one in which the fixed parity can be maintained) must have
enough dollars or yen to meet that demand. 
But there are differences between foreign and domestic currency liquid obligations. The
first is that, if the exchange rate is not fixed but flexible, then the Central Bank is able to serve as
a lender of last resort in domestic currency, and this added degree of freedom may help forestall
panic by depositors or creditors. In our theoretical work (Chang and Velasco 1998a) we study
this point at length. There we show that self-fulfilling bank runs can be ruled out if three factors -
-domestic currency liabilities, a Central Bank willing to serve as lender of last resort in domestic
currency, and a flexible exchange rate-- are present simultaneously. Conversely, the combination
of foreign currency liabilities, a fixed exchange rate and insufficient international reserves --
precisely the situation that prevailed in most Asian countries-- leaves financial systems illiquid
and vulnerable to shifts in investor sentiment. 
The other channel through which foreign currency liabilities can be destabilizing comes
into being comes after (and if) a crisis erupts and the exchange rate is devalued. If banks had
borrowed in foreign currency and lent in domestic currency, the devaluation imposes a capital
levy. But harmful effects can be felt even if domestic banks were not directly exposed to
exchange risk: if they lent dometically in foreign currency, then exchange risk was simply
transferred to the borrowing firms. To the extent that these firms' revenue is not in foreign
currency, then a devaluation sharply reduces their profitability and cuts their debt service3 36 6
capacity. According to many accounts, this mechanism has been at work in the Asian episode,
affecting in turn the health of domestic banks.23
VII. From Illiquidity to Financial Panic
Financial systems that are internationally illiquid live at the mercy of exogenous
economic conditions and of the moods of depositors and creditors. As we show in Chang and
Velasco (1998a and b), if initial liquid liabilities are large relative to liquid assets, then an
exogenous shock (such as an increase in the world interest rate) or a sudden loss of confidence
may prompt holders of the system’s liabilities to attempt to liquidate them. But they cannot all be
successful, since international illiquidity means, precisely, that the foreign currency value of their
holdings cannot be covered by the amount of international liquidity available to the system. 
Hence, a financial crisis may occur even if things would have been normal had
confidence stayed high. If a crisis does take place, financial institutions may be forced to call in
loans, interrupting productive projects, and sell fixed assets such as land, causing real estate and
stock prices to plunge. The government may try to help, but the crisis is one of excess demand
for foreign currency, and hence the government may see its own international reserves plunge in
the struggle. 
Acute illiquidity left Asia vulnerable to a sharp reversal in the direction of capital flows --
and that is exactly what happened in the second half of 1997. Available information suggests that
short term inflows suddenly reversed themselves during 1997.  Data from the Institute of
                                                          
23See Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998), Sachs and Radelet (1998), Asian Development Bank (1998).3 37 7
International Finance shows, in particular, that net international inflows of capital to the Asean 5
countries fell dramatically to –US$12 bn. in 1997, from US$ 93 bn in 1996. This fall in inflows
is accounted by and large by the behavior of foreign banks, whose positions in the Asean 5
countries dropped by US$ 21.3 bn. in 1997 after increasing by US$ 55.5 bn in 1996.  Combining
this information with BIS data, which shows that foreign banks increased their lending to the
Asean 5 countries by US$ 13 bn. in the first half of 1997, Radelet and Sachs (1998) conclude that
there must have been a capital outflow of about US$ 34 bn. in the second half of 1997,
equivalent to a negative shock of 3.6 of GDP.
This suggests that when potatoes became hot in mid 1997, international bankers panicked
and decided to close their exposure to the more troubled Asian countries. They were able to pull
out simply by refusing to roll over their loans, given the prevalence of short term borrowing. The
run by international creditors may, in addition, have been not only possible but also self
fulfilling. As discussed by Calvo (1995) and Chang and Velasco (1998b), when domestic
financial entities contract short term debt abroad to finance less liquid investments, a
coordination failure becomes possible. No individual creditor will find it profitable to roll over
its loan if she believes that the others will not either and that, as a consequence, domestic
borrowers will be forced into bankruptcy. In turn, the sudden increase in the need for liquidity
may in fact crush the financial system, confirming creditors’ expectations.
The magnitude of the crisis may be a reflection that the creditors’ run interacted with a
domestic run on deposits. As discussed in Chang and Velasco (1998b), foreign lenders may panic
and refuse to roll over short term loans if they believe that there will be a run on domestic
deposits. In turn, domestic depositors may run because they believe that financial institutions will
be forced into bankruptcy given that they cannot service their short term obligations. But the3 38 8
latter could have been prevented if the financial system had had access to the necessary
financing. In other words, in economies as open as the Asian-5 the distinction between a foreign
lenders’ panic and a domestic financial run is blurred: both may happen at the same time and
reinforce each other. Such a self-fulfilling panic seems to have been present in several instances
of the Asian episode. It was panic dumping of Korean assets, for instance, that brought Korea to
the verge of default in December 1997.24 Such a reaction by investors seems to have been
present in Thailand and Indonesia, at the very least. 
Does this mean that we simply view the Asian crisis as a jump to a bad equilibrium,
unrelated to fundamentals? Not quite. Much ink has been spilt on the question of whether weak
fundamentals caused the Asian crisis, but answers to this question are seldom very revealing.
Most sensible observers agree that there was a deterioration of macroeconomic performance in
the Asean-5 countries; many sensible observers also recognize that, as we have argued above, the
picture was a mixed one, and the Asean-5 did not fit the pattern of policy-induced instability that
one often saw in the crashes experienced by some populist government in Latin American
crashes of the 1980s. The debate stops there, for empirical observation  fails to provide a clear
guide as to when fundamentals are weak enough to guarantee a collapse. Most studies until now
have not been able to detect a clear pattern of behavior for macroeconomic variables in
anticipation of a crisis.25 Neither a current account gap nor a fiscal deficit nor a growth
slowdown seem necessary or sufficient to trigger a crash.   
Theory can help clarify matters somewhat. Recent models of crises (Obstfeld 1994, Cole
and Kehoe 1996,  Velasco 1997) show that there is a "middle region" for fundamentals (debt,
                                                          
24Even Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998), who are notoriously skeptical of such line of explanation. recognize as
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overvaluation, unemployment, etc.) that are neither "too good" nor "too bad," where crises can
occur if and only if contagion sets in or expectations turn pessimistic.Our emphasis on illiquidity
complements this perspective, and underscores the fact that  financial factors are at least as
important as real ones in trying to determine where that middle region lies in which self-fulfilling
crashes can take place. While the behavior of real macroeconomic fundamentals was quite varied
accross Asian countries, illiquidity was a common feature to all of the ones that eventually found
themselves in a crisis. In this the troubled Asian crisis differed from 1990s Latin America, which
also suffered from large real appreciation and current account deficits, but where financial
systems were a great deal more liquid, and banking sectors more solid. Paradoxically, this
incipient solidity was the result of the cleanup following earlier debt and/or banking crises in
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela. 
Our interpretation also helps account for some noteworthy features of the Asian episode.
One, stressed forcefully by Sachs and Radelet (1998), is that the crash seem to have been largely
unanticipated. They base their claim on several observations. First, interest rate spreads did nor
rise in the runup to the crisis. Second, capital inflows were large even in the first half of 1997.
Third, neither the credit rating agencies nor the IMF reports managed to predict what was to
happen. Of these three, the first two are most striking (credit agencies have a notoriously bad
forecasting record26 and the IMF is understandably very tight-lipped in its public
pronouncements), and also match the experience of Chile in 1982 and Mexico in 1994. In both
cases capital inflows continued even after real fundamentals had deteriorated. In Mexico, interest
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rate spreads remained practically constant between the time of the assassination of presidential
candidate Donaldo Colosio in March and the abandonment of the peg in December 1994.27
An emphasis on financial collapse also helps explain the apparent lack of proportionality
between the size of the sin (deteriorating fundamentals caused in part by external shocks such as
dollar appreciation and Japanese stagnation) and that of the punishment (plunging asset prices
and a sharp fall in growth rates relative to trend). In our theoretical work (Chang and Velasco
1998b) we show how, if initially financial systems are relatively illiquid, a "small" real shock can
push the economy into a region where a financial crisis is either possible (contingent on
expectations) or outright inevitable. If a financial crash does occur, bankruptcies and early
liquidation of investments have real consequences that "multiply" the harmful effect of the initial
shock. The process is likely to be costly and disruptive.
Finally, financial collapse --partially caused by contagion from neighboring countries--
helps explain the depth of the Indonesian troubles. As Radelet and Sachs (1998) stress,
“Indonesia’s extensive meltdown is far more severe that can be accounted for by flaws in
economic fundamentals, since those were not especially poor.” Indeed, Indonesia had the
smallest current account deficit among the Asean 5 (3.5% of GDP in 1996), enjoyed fast export
growth, before the crisis the budget had been in surplus by an average of more than 1% of GDP
for four years, and the stock market continued to rise strongly in 1997 --until the Thai crisis
erupted. But where Indonesia’s fundamentals were weaker, as we have seen, was in the relative
illiquidity of its economy. Its short-term external debt was large although, admittedly, the
borrowers were primarily non-financial firms rather than banks.  And at the end of 1996, the
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M2/reserves ratio was almost seven  in Indonesia --along with Korea the highest among the
Asean 5. It is not surprising that Indonesia was vulnerable to contagion.
VIII.   Special Issues and Conclusions
We conclude by considering what light the Asian episode sheds on some hotly contested
policy issues.
1. Financial liberalization and fragility
In their (1996) paper on the "twin crises,'' Kaminsky and Reinhart found that: a) Of the 26
banking crises they study, 18 are preceded by financial sector liberalization within a five year
interval and b) Financial liberalizations accurately signal 71 percent of all balance of payments
crises and 67 percent of all banking crises. The experiences of Chile, Mexico, and now East Asia,
strongly confirm this general tendency. Freeing interest rates, lowering reserve requirements, and
enhancing competition in the banking sector are sound policies on many grounds --and indeed,
countries in which they are applied often experience an expansion in financial intermediation.
But they can also sharply reduce the liquidity of the financial sector, and hence set the stage for a
potential crisis.
While we have focused on the effects of liberalization on liquidity, a host of other
potential ills have been mentioned in the literature. In particular, deregulation coupled with
explicit or implicit guarantees on banks and inadequate oversight can generate a serious moral
hazard problem. Overlending and excessive risk taking are likely results, as argued by Velasco
(1990) for the case of Chile and by Krugman (1998) for the recent Asian apisode. A lending4 42 2
boom and growing share of risky or bad loans often result. As Hausmann and Gavin (1995)
persuasively argue, the empirical link between lending booms and financial crises is very strong.
Rapid growth in the ratio of bank credit to GDP preceded financial troubles not just in Chile and
Mexico, but also in Argentina (1981), Colombia (1982-83), Uruguay (1982), Norway (1987),
Finland (1991-92), Japan (1992-93), and Sweden (1991).28
The moral of the story is the same in both cases. Financial liberalization should be
undertaken cautiously. Reserve requirements can be a useful tool in stabilizing a banking system,
as the experience of Argentina in 1995 showed. Lowering them to zero, as Mexico did in the run
up to the 1994 crash, smacks of imprudence.
2. Dealing with troubled banks at a time of crisis
The Asian troubles have ignited a lively debate on the wisdom of closing wobbly banks.
The IMF has pursued that policy vigorously, making bank interventions and closures part of its
conditionality in the affected countries. Fierce critics like Jeff Sachs have charged the policy with
inviting runs on healthy banks and inducing an unecessarily large credit crunch.
The proper policy prescription clearly depends on one's assessment of the crisis. If the
problem is primarily one of moral hazard and overlending (as Krugman 1998 has claimed for
Asia) or of outright fraud (as Akerlof and Romer 1993 argued for the U.S. S&L crisis), then
banks are insolvent and they should be either closed or forced to recapitalize. But if the problem
is one of illiquidity made acute by panicked behavior by depositors and creditors (as we have
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discusses evidence for this in the case of Chile. Krugman (1998) stresses the role of moral hazard and over-
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argued), liquidity should be injected into banks, not withdrawn from them, in order to avoid
costly asset liquidation.
Non-performing loans typically shoot up at times of trouble, often reaching up to a
quarter of bank assets. This would seem to confirm the insolvency-cum-closure view. The
problem is that it is not clear whether bad loans are causing the crisis or being caused by it.
Clearly, the combination of smaller bank credit, high real interest rates and sharp real
devaluations can render many loans bad that would have performed adequately had no liquidity
crisis occured. In Chile 1982 and Mexico 1994, many investment projects were left for dead. But,
as anyone who bought a half-built shopping center in Santiago at that time knows, those
investments turned out to be perfectly sound once the economy returned to normalcy, and their
value in dollars has risen several times in the intervening fifteen years.  This suggests that the
liquidity problem may well be the more serious one, and that authorities should think twice
before they engage in policies of wholesale bank closures.
3. Capital inflows and short-term debt
Short-term government debt proved to be dangerous in the case of Mexico; short term
external debt has proven to be risky in the case of Asia. What can be done about it?
Restraining short-term borrowing involves no free lunch, for both governments and banks
have perfectly sound reasons for wanting to make at least some of their liabilities short-term. At
the same time, it is not clear that decentralized decision-making delivers the optimal debt-
maturity structure: governments may rely too much on short-term debt if they suffer from time
inconsistency or high discounting; foreign creditors may only be willing to lend short because of
imperfect information or monitoring, or because of coordination failure with other creditors (if4 44 4
each creditor expects the others will only lend short, thus making a crisis possible, his best
response is also to lend short in order to have a chance to get out if the crisis comes). These
conjectures suggest that there may be a case for a policy discouraging short-term debt.
What policy, exactly, is a tricky matter. High required reserves on bank liquid bank
liabilities (whether in domestic or foreign currency, and whether owed to locals or foreigners) is
an obvious choice . It may be sound policy even if it has some efficiency costs or if causes some
disintermediation. An obvious caveat is that if banks are constrained firms will do their own
short-term borrowing, as it happened massively in Indonesia.
Taxes on capital inflows where the tax rate in inverse proportion to the maturity of the
inflow (and where long term flows such as FDI go untaxed at the border) have been used by
Colombia and Chile in the 1990s. They are often justified in terms of findings such as those of
Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996c), who found that a shorter maturity of capital inflows was a
helpful predictor of vulnerability to the Tequila effect in 1995, while the size of those inflows
was not. Empirical studies by Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1996) and Cárdenas and Barrera (1997)
find that such taxes (actually, non interest bearing reserve requirements) in Colombia and Chile
lengthen average maturity while leaving loan volumes unaffected. If so, they may also be
effective in reducing vulnerability.
4. Fixed versus flexible exchange rates
The combination of an illiquid financial system and fixed exchange rates can be lethal. If
the central bank commits not to serve as a lender of last resort, then bank runs can occur; if it acts
as a lender of last resort in domestic currency, bank runs are eliminated at the cost of causing
currency runs. Hence, under fixed exchange rates plus insufficient reserves (that is, illiquidity), a4 45 5
crisis is unavoidable if investor sentiment turns negative; the only choice authorities face is what
kind of crisis to have.
A regime in which bank deposits are denominated in domestic currency, the central bank
stands ready to act as a lender of last resort, and exchange rates are flexible, may help forestall
some types of self-fulfilling bank crises. The intuition for this is simple. An equilibrium bank run
occurs if each bank depositor expects others will run and exhaust the available resources. Under
a fixed rates regime, those who run to the bank withdraw domestic currency, which in turn they
use to buy hard currency at the central bank. If a depositor expects this sequence of actions to
cause the central bank to run out of dollars or yen, then it is a best response for her to run as well,
and the pessimistic expectations become self-fulfilling. On the other hand, under a flexible rates
regime plus a lender of last resort there is always enough domestic currency at the commercial
bank to satisfy those who run. But since the central bank is no longer compelled to sell all the
available reserves, those who run face a depreciation, while those who do not run know that there
will still be dollars available when they desire to withdraw them at a later date. Hence, running to
the bank is no longer a best response, pessimistic expectations are not self-fulfilling, and a
depreciation need not happen in equilibrium.
In our view this represents a strong case in favor of flexible exchange rates. But there are
caveats. One is that such a mechanism can protect banks against self-fulfilling pessimism on the
part of domestic depositors (whose claims are in local currency), not against panic by external
creditors who hold short-term i.o.u's denominated in dollars. To the extent that this was the case
in Asia, a flexible exchange rate system would have provided only limited protection.29
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Proper implementation is subtle. If they are to be stabilizing, flexible rates must be part of
a regime, whose operation agents take into account when forming expectations. Suddenly
adopting a float because reserves are dwindling, as Mexico did in 1994 or several Asian
countries have done recently, may have the opposite effect by further frightening concerned
investors. In fact, the case has been made that it was precisely the sudden (but late) abandonment
of the peg that pushed Mexico to a "bad equilibrium."30
5. The case for an international lender of last resort
If financial crises such as those in East Asia were at least partially caused by
self-fulfilling liquidity squeezes on banks, there is a role for an international lender of last resort
that can help overcome a financial system's international illiquidity. Funds from above to prevent
unnecessary credit crunches and avoid costly liquidation of investment can increase welfare.
The usual (and valid) objection is moral hazard. But this need not be a rationale for policy
paralysis. Fire insurance and bank deposit guarantees also risk inducing moral hazard, but the
risk can be minimized by proper contract design and appropiate monitoring. No one advocates
banning fire insurance simply because it leads some homeowners to be careless with their
fireplaces. The same is true of an international lender of last resort.
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Table 1: Chile Macro Indicators
Growth(%) Inflation (%) Fiscal Surplus RER CA Reserves
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) (Millions US$)
1979 8.28 33.33 4.8 140.2 -5.72 1938
1980 7.78 33.33 5.5 169.9 -7.15 3123
1981 5.53 18.75 0.8 175.1 -14.49 3213
1982 -14.09 10.53 -3.4 134.8 -9.48 1815
1983 -0.73 23.81 -2.8 144.9 -5.65 2036
Note: An increase in the RER denotes real appreciation
Source: IFS, JP Morgan
Table 2: Mexico Macro Indicators
Growth(%) Inflation (%) Fiscal Surplus RER CA  Reserves
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) (Millions US$)
1991 4.17 22.7 2.9 103.8 -5.13 17726
1992 3.59 15.48 2.9 111.6 -7.31 18942
1993 2.00 9.74 2.1 120.8 -5.81 25110
1994 4.44 6.95 0.5 97.7 -6.98 6278
1995 -6.13 35.00 101.7 -0.23 16847
Source: IFS, JP Morgan5 51 1
Table 3: Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP)
Chile Mexico
1979 34.09 1991 26.13
1980 43.38 1992 32.67
1981 51.08 1993 33.51
1982 82.55 1994 41.47
1983 74.11 1995 30.44
Source: IFS
Table 4:  Private Capital Inflows (percentage of GDP)
Chile Mexico
Total Non FDI Total Non FDI
1980 12.3 11.5 1992 7.5 6.2
1981 14.9 13.7 1993 8.0 6.8
1982 4.1 2.4 1994 3.1 0.2
1983 5.6 4.9 1995 0.4 -3.5
Source: World Bank5 52 2
Table 5: M2 as a Fraction of Reserves
Chile Mexico
1979 2.39 1991 4.60
1980 2.29 1992 5.16
1981 2.87 1993 4.43
1982 5.24 1994 19.90
1983 3.67 1995 5.20
Source: IFS
Table 6: Nonperforming Loans (% of total loans)
Chile Mexico
1980 0.9 1993 7.26
1981 2.4 1994 9.02
1982 8.2 1995 12.26
1983 18.7 1996 11.98
Source: Velasco and Cabezas (1998), Banco de Mexico.5 53 3
Table 7 
Asean 5 Countries: Basic Macroeconomic Data (Percentage Points)
Real GDP Growth Inflation Gov't Surplus Savings/GDP Investment/GDP
90-96 Avg 1996 90-96 Avg 1996 90-96 Avg 1996 90-96 Avg 1996 90-96 Avg 1996
Indonesia 7.3 8.0 8.6 6.4 -0.2 0.0 28.4 30.6 33.4 32.7
Korea 7.7 7.1 6.4 4.9 -0.5 0.2 35.4 33.9 36.5 36.8
Malaysia 8.8 8.6 4.0 3.6 -0.4 -0.5 34.6 40.6 37.0 42.2
Philippines 2.8 5.7 10.7 8.4 -2.2 -0.5 19.1 22.7 22.5 23.9
Thailand 8.5 5.5 5.1 5.9 2.6 1.5 28.6 31.5 40.3 42.5
Sources: IMF, JP Morgan5 54 4
Table 8: Public Sector Debt, % GDP
Indonesia Korea MalaysiaPhilippines Thailand
1990 45.7 8.3 81.3 51.3 18.4
1991 40.3 11.5 76.4 49.7 13.3
1992 42.7 11.5 66.1 52.8 10.9
1993 37.5 10.9 59.3 67.1 8.4
1994 36.6 10.0 50.1 56.4 5.8
1995 30.9 9.0 42.8 NA 4.7
1996 24.1 8.6 NA NA 3.7
Source: World Bank
Table 9: International Reserves (millions US$)
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
1990 7459 14793 9754 924 13305
1991 9258 13701 10886 3246 17517
1992 10449 17121 17228 4403 20359
1993 11263 20228 27249 4676 24473
1994 12133 25639 25423 6017 29332
1995 13708 32678 23774 6372 35982
1996 18251 34037 27009 10030 37731
Source: IMF5 55 5
Table 10: Current Account Surplus, % GDP
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
1990 -2.8 -0.9 -1.9 -6.1 -8.5
1991 -3.7 -3.0 -8.5 -2.3 -7.7
1992 -2.2 -1.5 -3.4 -1.9 -5.9
1993 -1.2 0.1 -4.2 -5.5 -5.3
1994 -1.4 -1.2 -5.7 -4.8 -8.1
1995 -3.2 -2.0 -7.7 -2.6 -7.6
1996 -3.3 -4.8 -6.5 -3.5 -7.5
Source: IMF
Table 11: Foreign Debt/Exports
Year Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand
1990 2.34 0.44 2.30 0.90
1991 2.37 0.43 2.19 1.00
1992 2.30 0.43 1.87 0.97
1993 2.13 0.48 1.87 1.06
1994 2.32 0.43 1.63 1.12
1995 2.34 0.40 1.19 1.12
1996 2.21 0.42 0.98 1.21
Memo: Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico  Peru
1989 5.42 2.94 1.84 1.97 4.07
1996 2.96 2.94 1.41 1.36 3.52
Source: Global Development Finance 1998, World Bank5 56 6
Table 12
Real Effective Foreign Exchange Rates
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Mexico Argentina Brazil Chile
1987 101.1 87.0 111.1 99.0 95.2 95.1 86.2 61.9 100.2
1988 98.8 101.9 100.5 101.7 97.3 110.6 117.7 69.2 98.5
1989 101.9 106.2 102.9 108.2 99.3 101.7 70.2 93.1 97.8
1990 97.4 96.1 97.1 92.4 102.2 100.3 138.0 76.3 100.9
1991 99.6 91.5 96.9 103.1 99.0 103.8 112.0 71.7 106.2
1992 100.8 87.7 109.7 107.1 99.7 111.6 114.0 77.5 115.7
1993 103.8 85.2 111.0 97.4 101.9 120.8 114.7 86.2 112.7
1994 101.0 84.7 107.1 111.7 98.3 97.7 109.2 108.7 120.1
1995 100.5 87.7 106.9 109.5 101.7 77.2 110.6 96.6 120.8
1996 105.4 87.1 112.1 116.3 107.6 95.5 115.4 99.6 128.5
1997 62.3 59.2 84.8 90.8 72.3 106.1 123.0 107.4 133.4
Data are for the end of period. Average 1990 = 100. Source: JP Morgan5 57 7
Table 13
Short Term Debt vs Reserves
Short-Term Debt (millions of US$)
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Total
Jun-90 10,360     15,528     1,761       3,019            7,026       37,694          
Jun-94 18,882     34,908     8,203       2,646            27,151     91,790          
Jun-97 34,661     70,182     16,268     8,293            45,567     174,971        
International Reserves (millions of US$)
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Total
Jun-90 4,693 14,642 8,114 948 11,882 40,279
Jun-94 10,915 21,684 32,608 6,527 27,375 99,109
Jun-97 20,336 34,069 26,586 9,781 31,361 122,133
Debt to Reserves Ratio
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Total
Jun-90 2.208 1.061 0.217 3.185 0.591 0.936
Jun-94 1.730 1.610 0.252 0.405 0.992 0.926
Jun-97 1.704 2.060 0.612 0.848 1.453 1.433
Source: BIS, IMF5 58 8
Table 14: M2 as a Multiple of International Reserves
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand
1990 6.16 6.48 2.91 16.33 4.49
1991 5.51 8.33 2.99 4.82 4.10
1992 5.61 7.20 2.64 4.35 4.10
1993 6.09 6.91 2.09 4.90 4.05
1994 6.55 6.45 2.47 4.86 3.84
1995 7.09 6.11 3.33 5.86 3.69
1996 6.50 6.51 3.34 4.50 3.90
Source: IMF
Table 15
Short-Term Debt and Total Debt
Total Debt (US $ millions)
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Total
Jun-90 20,076        23,369       6,864       9,055           11,675    71,039    
Jun-94 30,902        48,132       13,874     5,990           36,545    135,443  
Jun-97 58,726        103,432     28,820     14,115         69,382    274,475  
Short-Term Debt (US $ millions)
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Total
Jun-90 10,360        15,528       1,761       3,019           7,026      37,694    
Jun-94 18,882        34,908       8,203       2,646           27,151    91,790    
Jun-97 34,661        70,182       16,268     8,293           45,567    174,971  
Short Term as % of Total Debt
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Total
Jun-90 51.60 66.45 25.66 33.34 60.18 53.06
Jun-94 61.10 72.53 59.12 44.17 74.29 67.77
Jun-97 59.02 67.85 56.45 58.75 65.68 63.75
Source: Bank Of International Settlements5 59 9
Table 16
External Debt Denominated in Local Currency
Total Debt (US$ millions)
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Total
Jun-90 20,076    23,369         6,864      9,055            11,675    71,039          
Jun-94 30,902    48,132         13,874    5,990            36,545    135,443        
Jun-97 58,726    103,432       28,820    14,115          69,382    274,475        
Currency Positions (Claims - Liabilities)
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Total
Jun-90 468         2,685           212         430               679         4,474            
Jun-94 843         3,182           1,513      323               2,145      8,006            
Jun-97 1,262      6,152           2,977      2,239            3,906      16,536          
Local Currency as a % of Total Debt
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Total
Jun-90 2.33 11.49 3.09 4.75 5.82 6.30
Jun-94 2.73 6.61 10.91 5.39 5.87 5.91
Jun-97 2.15 5.95 10.33 15.86 5.63 6.02
Source: Bank Of International Settlements